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I. Introduction 
For the past few years, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has been a 
constant source of debate among the American public. Whether it has been in the halls of 
Congress or on the street corners of U.S. cities, everyone seems to have an opinion on this 
divisive law. Many scholars agree that “Obamacare,” as it is known colloquially, is an integral 
part of the rise in ideological polarization among our lawmakers. Due to this political 
polarization, implementation of the Affordable Care Act has varied across the United States. 
Generally, states with liberal legislatures have embraced the act, while states with conservative 
legislatures have attempted to block it (Obama Care Facts 2013, 1). This ideological divide has 
very important implications for citizens. Many of the provisions of the law contain health 
insurance provisions that will affect the daily lives of nearly every citizen. The implementation 
of these provisions is essential to their success. My thesis seeks to discover the true effects of the 
ideological divide on the Affordable Care Act by doing a state-by-state analysis. In doing this, I 
answer the question: “How have state government actions altered the effectiveness of the 
Affordable Care Act?” 
I answer this question because of its importance in current American politics. Because it 
deeply affects the lives of citizens, it is the duty of researchers like myself to investigate the 
ACA thoroughly. This thesis provides a guide with which to examine future state 
implementation actions. In a broader sense, this study is also important because it examines the 
manner in which truly federal policies work. When I mention the term “truly federal”, I mean 
that the ACA requires both the national and state governments to cooperate on implementation. 
While the ACA is a national law, states were given a considerable amount of power in its 
implementation. This thesis serves as a primer on the interaction between the state and federal 
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governments in implementing federal laws. Because of its current relevance and its broader 
implications for federal policies, I study ACA implementation.   
The next section of this study presents a review of current literature on the Affordable 
Care Act. By summarizing this literature, I provide a scholastic introduction to the Affordable 
Care Act for the reader. After providing a summary of this literature, I describe how my thesis 
fits into the existing research and expands upon it. Next, I provide a theoretical argument for the 
topic, outlining the manner in which state government actions impact Affordable Care Act 
implementation. In doing this, I present a causal mechanism, which describes each phase of this 
process in detail. The causal mechanism leads to my hypothesis, which predicts a link between 
state government actions and effectiveness of the ACA. I then propose to test the hypothesis by 
testing the impact of state government actions on two goals of the Affordable Care Act: “better 
access to care” and “more affordable coverage”. Next, I present several regression analyses to 
test these goals. For goal one, while exchange implementation had some effect, states that 
expanded Medicaid were most likely to provide “better access to care” for citizens (goal one). 
The result for goal two is less conclusive. While there is some evidence to support the hypothesis 
that state government actions impacted the goal of “more affordable coverage”, there were 
conflicting results among my models. Ultimately, I conclude that states that acted on exchange 
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II. Literature Review 
Pre-First Enrollment Period 
The existing literature on the Affordable Care Act covers a broad range of topics and 
their relationship with the law. As discussed in this review, the current research focuses on 
individual states and their specific outcomes. It also discusses individual health issues and their 
relation to the Affordable Care Act. However, while there is a large amount of research on 
specific states and issues, the current literature lacks a comprehensive analysis that describes the 
link between state government actions and effectiveness for all 50 states. As I detail later, this is 
where my research will fit in. By providing a causal mechanism to describe ACA outcomes for 
all 50 states, I add to the current research base on the topic. 
One of the major works that addresses implementation of the ACA is by Haeder and 
Weimer (2013). Their article provides two methods to analyze state government actions toward 
implementation of the law: whether a state joined a lawsuit against the ACA, and whether a state 
created its own insurance exchange. According to this research, 22 states joined a lawsuit, while 
28 did not. As for creating their own exchanges, 15 initially created one, while 35 did not. It is 
important to note that these statistics slightly changed as the law’s implementation moved 
forward. These statistics present a general trend among the states. In states that are under 
Democratic control (specifically of the legislature), there is much less opposition toward the 
ACA. Conversely, states that are controlled by Republicans tended to take negative action 
toward the ACA’s implementation. These metrics, as well as the context behind them, are vital in 
analyzing state government actions toward the law.  
The authors also describe several different themes of exchange implementation. Divided 
into five categories, these themes describe one end of the spectrum as “a variety of Democrat-
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leaning states moved quickly after enactment of the ACA and established exchanges between 
December 2010 and July 2011” (Haeder and Weimer 2013, 38). The other end features 
“Republicans outside Washington, D.C. [that] found themselves confronted with an interesting 
dilemma: either support the implementation of the ACA and develop local, conservative 
solutions or come out vocally against it and refuse to cooperate at all costs” (Haeder and Weimer 
2013, 38). It is extremely important to consider each state’s individual dilemmas when analyzing 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act. Once again, this article illustrates the general trend 
in state government actions on the ACA among party lines. While the metrics at the beginning of 
the paper provide important data on the nation as a whole, it also includes some specific cases 
that provide important context. 
While Haeder and Weimer (2013) briefly mention these important specific cases, 
Benjamin, Slagle, and Jones (2013) expand on them. This article, which mentions the Haeder 
and Weimer paper as a starting point, provides an in-depth view of states like “Oregon, [in 
which] the adoption of a rigorous rate review process resulted in […] lowered premium rates” 
(Benjamin, Slagle, and Jones 2013, 48). It also discusses “New York, [which had] a radical 
reduction in premiums (in some cases by nearly 50 percent) and the launch of an all-payer-
claims database that is expected to further reduce costs and regularize the health care 
marketplace” (Benjamin, Slagle, and Jones 2013, 48).  Examples like these provide an excellent 
idea of the success that the law has had in states that took positive actions towards implementing 
it. While this article presents cases of successful implementation, it lacks examples of states that 
did not take positive actions on the law. A more complete analysis of ACA implementation 
would also address states that did not take proactive steps towards implementation. 
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Along with these specific state cases, Benjamin, Slagle, and Jones (2013) also address 
national measures that were adopted to ease state implementation as a whole, especially in states 
that did not accept the ACA right away. One such measure that they address is “postponing the 
employer mandate [until 2015, which] will potentially benefit the state-based individual 
insurance exchanges by increasing the number of covered lives in those exchanges” (Benjamin, 
Slagle, and Jones 2013, 38). The inclusion of this national policy reveals an important trend 
about ACA implementation. Because many states were vehemently opposed to implementing the 
law from the outset, the national government had to adjust its policies. This article, combined 
with Haeder and Weimer’s (2013) analysis, provides excellent detail about implementation of 
the ACA as well as each state’s actions toward it. 
While the Benjamin article presents a broadened view of health care effectiveness by 
focusing on the system as a whole, Martin, Strach, and Schackman (2013) focus on a single 
issue. In narrowing its view to just HIV care, this article provides another way to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the ACA. The article does this by discussing the link between state government 
action and success. The authors found that, “States such as California and Maryland that have 
strong political commitment to implement the ACA (including Medicaid expansion) […] are 
likely to do better than under current conditions” (Martin, Strach, and Schackman 2013, 95). By 
accounting for states’ actions toward the ACA in the context of HIV care, the authors were able 
to find a positive link between state government actions and effectiveness. Later in the paper, the 
authors address states that did not take action on the ACA. According to their findings, “there 
may be no change or possibly worse HIV health outcomes in states without political commitment 
and resources” (Martin, Strach, and Schackman 2013, 95). Once again, the authors create a clear 
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link between state government actions and effectiveness of the ACA. However, a more complete 
analysis would feature many different health outcomes, not just a single issue. 
 
Post-First Enrollment Period 
 While there is a plethora of articles on the time before the first enrollment period, the 
research from after the first enrollment period is much more limited. However, despite these 
limitations, there are some key studies on this period. One of the major analyses on this period is 
by Blumenthal and Collins (2014). This study provides a report on the progress of the Affordable 
Care Act nationwide. In completing this report, Blumenthal and Collins (2014) come to three 
main conclusions. First, they conclude that, “As the number of individuals benefitting from the 
law grows, its wholesale repeal will grow less likely, although the law could still be importantly 
modified in the future” (Blumenthal and Collins 2014, 281). This consideration is important 
when examining the implementation of the law. If the law were to be repealed in the future, 
current analyses would be rendered mostly irrelevant. However, because the law will not be 
repealed, research on its current form is relevant.  
The second conclusion that Blumenthal and Collins (2014) draw is that “experience with 
the ACA will vary enormously among states” (Blumenthal and Collins 2014, 281). While there 
are many differences between states, the article specifically mentions that, “those deciding not to 
expand Medicaid will benefit far less from the law” (Blumenthal and Collins 2014, 281). Lastly, 
the article’s third conclusion maintains that, “the sustainability of the coverage expansions will 
depend to a great extent on the ability to control the overall costs of care in the United States” 
(Blumenthal and Collins 2014, 281). If the costs are not controlled properly, the premiums will 
become too expensive for citizens. All three of these conclusions lead the authors to their final 
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contention that, “Developing and spreading innovative approaches to health care delivery that 
provide greater quality at lower cost is the next great challenge facing the nation” (Blumenthal 
and Collins 2014, 281). Blumenthal and Collins (2014) present an excellent focus on health care 
costs and the future problems that these costs could cause for the Affordable Care Act. 
My project is an excellent addition to the current literature on the Affordable Care Act’s 
implementation and effectiveness. All of the articles mentioned in this review provide specific 
examples and detailed statistics on the Affordable Care Act. While some focus on 
implementation/action, others focus on effectiveness. In some cases, the authors even link these 
variables, as I do in this study. However, the authors of these papers often focus on specific state 
cases, as in the Benjamin article, or specific issues, as in the Martin article. My thesis contributes 
to this existing research by aggregating these specific examples and inferring about the system as 
a whole. There is not much scholarly research about the law’s effectiveness nationwide. This 
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My thesis tests the impact of state government actions on implementation of the ACA. I 
hypothesize that the law will have its greatest impact in states that have fully embraced it through 
their actions. Conversely, it will have the least impact in states that have inhibited its 
implementation. In this case, I am considering two specific state government actions: the 
creation of a state exchange, and the expansion of Medicaid. In my analysis, I compare the states 
that chose to take these actions to the states that opted against these actions. I seek to find 
whether these actions truly affected the desired outcomes of the law in each state.  
My causal mechanism relies on this approach. I argue that the ideological composition of 
a state determined its initial actions in response to the law’s implementation. States that are 
controlled by Democrats tended to take action on the law, while Republican-controlled states 
tried to inhibit its implementation. The states that took proactive actions toward implementing 
the law adapted it to fit their state the best, mostly through the design of their exchange and 
Medicaid expansion. Instead of spending energy opposing the law, the legislatures and governors 
of these states have devoted their legislative power to improving it and promoting it to the 
public. In turn, these state-level improvements and promotions led to more effective outcomes 
for the law in states that took action before the first enrollment period. This causal mechanism 
describes the exact elements that link state government actions to effectiveness of the Affordable 
Care Act. Therefore, my hypothesis can be described as follows. 
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Hypothesis: In a comparison of states, those that set up Affordable Care Act exchanges and/or 
expanded Medicaid will be more likely to have positive results than those that did not. 
Conversely, those that did not set up Affordable Care Act exchanges and/or expanded Medicaid 
will be more likely to have negative results than those that did. 
 
Other Factors 
While the actions of a state have a great impact on the effectiveness of the ACA, other 
factors are also compelling. As mentioned before, the party composition plays a large role in 
state government decision-making. Another important factor has to do with the wealth of a state. 
The income of citizens within a state also may have had an effect on the number of citizens that 
previously had insurance. If more citizens could initially afford insurance in a state, it follows 
that the effectiveness of the law in insuring new people may have been lower in these states. I 
control for these income differences in my theory. I also argue that the racial composition of a 
state may affect the success of the law. The ability of some racial groups to obtain health care is 
limited by certain barriers to access, and it is important to account for these barriers in the theory. 
Lastly, it is important to recognize the importance of structure of care delivery in the theory. 
While some citizens may receive health care under new plans, the method in which they receive 
this care within these plans can vary greatly. Generally, managed care systems tend to be more 
innovative and these systems drive down costs in the insurance market. Pay for service systems 
tend to cause opposite results. It is important to control for the structure of care delivery offered 
within a state to account for these differences. While this list just presents the most relevant 
controls, I detail each control variable in the research design portions of the project. 
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IV. General Research Design 
Unit of Analysis: The States 
 Pristine research design is critical in my analysis. First, I must define the cases to be used 
in this analysis. For the statistical segment of this analysis, I use data from all 50 states. The data 
covers the differences in health care before and after the first ACA enrollment period. Therefore, 
the data that I present on the uninsured population and the differences in cost comes from 2013 
and 2014. Every other measure that I use for the independent variables comes from 2013. This is 
due to the fact that I want to capture the conditions each state was under as it entered the first 
enrollment period. By collecting data from every state, I am able to successfully determine the 
impact of state government actions on effectiveness through statistical analysis. 
 
Independent Variable: State Government Actions 
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Next, it is important to define the concepts that shape this research question. The first 
concept that must be defined is “state government actions.” This variable serves as the 
independent variable of interest in my thesis. While this concept could be defined in many 
different ways, I operationally define “state government actions” based on two criteria: whether 
or not a state formed its own Affordable Care Act exchange and whether or not a state decided to 
expand Medicaid. The data for these criteria come from Kaiser Family Foundation (2013) 
research on health care reform. The expansion of Medicaid is a relatively simple concept to 
incorporate into a statistical model due to the fact that there are only two outcomes to this 
process: either “expansion” or “no expansion.” Overall, 24 states expanded Medicaid before the 
first enrollment period, and 26 chose not to expand (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013, 1). The 
data is presented in figure one. 
However, while this concept is simple, a state’s decision to build its own exchange is 
more complex. In deciding whether or not to build its own exchange, a state could choose one of 
three options: build it themselves, work with the federal government to build it, or leave it 
completely for the federal government to build. In this analysis, I classify states into two 
categories. States that have built their own exchanges or worked with the federal government are 
grouped in one category. The states that decided to leave their exchange creation completely to 
the federal government form the other category. This distinction makes sense because my 
analysis seeks to analyze the difference between states that took action on the Affordable Care 
Act and states that did not take action. Based on this distinction, 23 states took action in forming 
their own exchange and 27 did not (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013, 1). The data for this 
variable is also presented in figure one. It is important to note that exchange creation and 
Medicaid expansion are highly correlated in a positive direction (r = .7197, sig. = 0.000). This 
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indicates that many of the states that built their own exchange also expanded Medicaid. Both a 
state’s decision to create an exchange and its decision to expand Medicaid are the variables that 
operationalize “state government actions”. 
 
Dependent Variable: Effectiveness 
While the variables for state government actions represent the key independent variables 
in this analysis, effectiveness is the dependent variable. On the surface, effectiveness can be 
defined in several different ways. For this analysis, the concept of effectiveness of the ACA is 
defined as the extent to which states exhibit the law’s intended effects. The law’s intended 
effects, as described by the White House website, are “better access to care, more affordable 
coverage, stronger rights and protections, and stronger Medicare.” (Obama 2014, 1) The last two 
mentioned goals, “stronger rights and protections” and “stronger Medicare”, are not included in 
my analysis. These goals deal with insurance rights that are written into federal law, and are not 










16	   Jones	  
	  
V. Goal 1: “Better Access to Care” 
i. Specific Research Design 
Dependent Variable: Change in Uninsured Population 
Figure 2 (Source: Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, 2014) 
 
 
The first of the two goals is “better access to care.” This goal basically addresses the 
number of people that have the ability to obtain health care in each state. In my analysis, this 
concept is operationalized by the percentage point difference in insured persons in each state 
before and after the first Affordable Care Act enrollment period. The Gallup-Healthways Well-
Being Index (2014) released a report on the percentage of people insured in each state before and 
after the first enrollment period, along with the difference between the two values. It is important 
to note that the negative values in this report indicate a drop in the uninsured population, and 
therefore, a positive impact of the law. The orientation of this variable is important during the 
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perfect set of values that I use to measure “better access to care” in each state. The probability 
density of this variable is presented in figure two. 
 
Control Variables: Poverty, Political Party, Managed Care Penetration, Minority Population 
Figure 3 (Sources: Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, 2014 and U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) 
 
 
Along with the key dependent and independent variables in this analysis, I include 
several control variables. These variables are carefully selected due to their perceived impact on 
access to care. The first variable I have selected is the poverty rate of each state. As I mentioned 
in the theory section, this variable is important to consider because it affects the number of 
citizens who originally had access to health care, as well as the number of citizens who could 
enroll in it after the new subsidies were enacted. The more impoverished citizens that a state has, 
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poverty rate may also have an effect on the cost of health care. If the citizens of a state are too 
poor to afford health insurance, insurers may be incentivized to lower the costs and sell to more 
people. The data for this variable comes from the United States Census Bureau (2010). The 
correlation coefficient between poverty rate and change in uninsured population shows a weakly 
inverse relationship between the two variables (r = -0.2408, sig = 0.0921). As the poverty rate of 
a state increases, the percent change in uninsured population from 2013 to 2014 tends to 
decrease. A scatter plot of the data is presented in figure three. 
 
Figure 4 (Sources: Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index and Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014) 
 
 
As mentioned in the Theory section, it is also important to have control variables for the 
political party control in each state. In this case, I use dummy variables for the party of the 
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bar graph. This graph indicates that the uninsured population decreased more in Democratic-
controlled states than Republican-controlled states. The data for these variables (as presented in 
figure four), comes from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2014).  
 
Figure 5 (Sources: Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index and Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014) 
 
 
 As I mentioned in the Theory section, it is also important to control for the structure of 
care delivery within a state. In order to control for structure of care delivery, I use the managed 
care penetration of a state. The managed care (HMO) penetration rate is defined as, “the 
percentage of business that an HMO is able to capture in a particular subscriber group or in the 
market as a whole” (Patient-Physician Network 2014, 1). The level of access to care, as well as 
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being cheaper and easier to access typically). The HMO penetration of an area provides a perfect 
measure to analyze the structure of care delivery. The data for this variable comes from the 
Kaiser Family Foundation (2014). The correlation coefficient between the managed care 
penetration rate and the change in uninsured population illustrates a weakly positive relationship 
between HMO penetration and the change in the uninsured population (r = 0.0269, sig = 0.8529). 
As the HMO penetration rate of a state increases, the percent change in uninsured population 
from 2013 to 2014 tends to increase. A scatter plot of the data is presented in figure five. 
 
Figure 6 (Sources: Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, 2014 and U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) 
 
 
Lastly, I also include a variable for the racial differences between states in my model. As 
I mentioned in the Theory section, different racial groups often face barriers to accessing health 
























0 20 40 60 80
Minority Population (%)
Change in Uninsured Population v. Minority Population
Political	  Science	  Department	  
University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  
21	  
	  
barriers. This variable is measured using the percentage of minorities in each state. The data for 
this variable comes from the United States Census Bureau (2011). The correlation between the 
percentage of minorities in a state and the percentage change in the uninsured population is 
weakly negative (r = -0.120, sig = 0.4066). This indicates that states with a greater percentage of 
minorities tended to experience a greater reduction in their uninsured population. A scatter plot 
of the data is presented in figure six. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 (Sources: Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, 2014; Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2013-14; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) 
Variable Mean  Standard Deviation 
Change in Uninsured -2.800 2.535 
Exchange Type 0.460 0.503 
Medicaid Expansion 0.480 0.505 
Poverty Rate 12.142 3.044 
Governor’s Party 0.420 0.500 
Senate Party Control 0.400 0.495 
HMO Penetration 17.613 11.677 
Minority Percentage 28.600 15.480 
 
 The relevant summary statistics for my choice variables are presented in table one. From 
these statistics, I notice several important trends in the data. First, the mean values for exchange 
type and Medicaid expansion are .46 and .48. These values, which represent the percentage of 
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states that acted on the Affordable Care Act, match up with the values presented in figure one. 
These numbers appear to correlate well with the values for governor’s party and senate party 
control. At means of .42 and .40, these numbers represent the percentage of governorships and 
senate chambers held by democrats. The numbers for poverty (12.14), HMO penetration (17.61), 
and minority percentage (28.60) all represent the average percentage values for these 
characteristics in each state. The standard deviation values for each of the variables are not 
incredibly significant. However, it is important to note that the standard deviation in poverty rate 
(3.04) is much smaller than the standard deviation in HMO penetration (11.68) and minority 
percentage (15.48). While these statistics do not describe much on their own, they are important 
to keep in mind throughout the analysis. 
 
ii. Data Analysis: OLS Regression 
The analysis of goal one requires the before and after estimates of several different 
metrics. In order to analyze the ACA’s effectiveness in each grouping of states, I use regression 
analysis. Specifically, I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. For the goal of “better 
access to care,” I regress the change in uninsured population on the model that I outlined in the 
Research Design section. My null hypothesis is that the type of exchange that a state opted for 
has no effect on the percentage point change in enrolled population. My alternative hypothesis is 
that exchange type has a significant effect on enrolled population. In this section, positive 
coefficients are interpreted as a rise in uninsured population and negative coefficients are 
interpreted as a decline in uninsured population. This implies that a positive result is represented 
by a negative regression coefficient. The concept of “better access to care” implies that the law 
should have caused a significant drop in the uninsured population. 
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Table 2: “Better Access to Care” OLS Model 
OLS Regression (Dependent Variable: Percentage Point Change in Uninsured Population) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value (*Sig) 
Exchange Type -1.192 0.873 0.179 
Medicaid Expansion -1.953 0.671 0.006* 
Poverty Rate -0.261 0.102 0.014* 
Governor’s Party -0.899 0.847 0.295 
Senate Party Control 0.729 1.109 0.515 
HMO Penetration 0.056 0.031 0.077 
Minority Percentage -0.023 0.023 0.335 
Coefficient 1.610 1.400 0.257 
N = 50, Prob > F = 0.003, R-Squared = 0.3815, Adjusted R-Squared = 0.2784 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
First, I analyze the goal of “better access to care” using an OLS regression. The results 
are presented above. Most notably, the variable for Medicaid expansion is significant at the 95% 
confidence level. This leads me to reject the null hypothesis that, when controlling for other 
relevant variables, Medicaid expansion has no effect on the change in uninsured population in 
each state. This indicates that my findings support the hypothesis that Medicaid expansion has an 
effect on the change in uninsured population while controlling for all other factors. Specifically, 
the coefficient on this variable indicates a reduction of approximately 1.19% more of the 
uninsured population in states that decided to expand Medicaid. Conversely, states that did not 
elect to expand Medicaid can expect to have approximately 1.19% more uninsured citizens than 
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states who did expand, controlling for other relevant factors. The complete results of the 
regression are shown in table two. 
 It is also important to note that the variable for exchange type is not significant at the 
95% confidence level. This finding leads me to fail to reject the hypothesis that, controlling for 
other factors, the type of exchange that a state opted for has no effect on the change in uninsured 
population. While the coefficient is negative, indicating that the state’s decision to act on 
exchange creation tended to cause a decrease in the uninsured population, this variable is not 
significant. Therefore, I do not conclude that the type of exchange has an effect on the uninsured 
population. 
 As for the control variables, only poverty rate is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
This variable is “poverty level”, which indicates the percentage of citizens below the poverty line 
in each state. In this case, I reject the hypothesis that the poverty level of a state has no effect on 
the percentage change in uninsured citizens, controlling for all other relevant factors. 
Alternatively, my findings support that the more impoverished citizens that a state has, the 
greater the reduction in uninsured population that occurred during the first enrollment period. 
Specifically, the coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in the impoverished population 
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Table 3: “Better Access to Care” OLS Hypothesis Test 
Joint Significance Test 
Variables P-Value (*Sig) 
Exchange Type, Medicaid Expansion 0.016* 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
 Because my hypothesis directly mentions the impact of state government actions, it is 
important to quantitatively test whether or not they have a significant impact on the uninsured 
population. I use a joint significance test to directly evaluate this hypothesis. The results of the 
test illustrate that the type of exchange and Medicaid expansion are jointly significant at the 95% 
confidence level. This leads me to reject the hypothesis that, when controlling for other factors, 
exchange type and Medicaid expansion have no effect on the change in uninsured population. 
Specifically, as I have discussed, the coefficients on these two variables illustrate their marginal 
effects on the uninsured population. This conclusion, as well as the magnitude of the coefficient, 










26	   Jones	  
	  
iii. Data Analysis: IV Regression 
Figure 7 (Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014) 
 
  
After completing this initial regression, I wondered about the exogeneity of my key 
independent variable. One of the key conditions for OLS regression is that the independent 
variables in a model must be randomly determined. In this case, I believe that the variable for 
exchange type may not be randomly determined. This is due to the importance of the political 
party of a state in selecting an exchange type. Rather than the exchange type of a state being 
randomly determined, the political party of the governor and senate in the state often determines 
the exchange type that it has. This relationship between the variables is presented in figure seven. 
As indicated by the graph, Republican governors and senators chose to create a state exchange 
17.2 and 16.7 percent of the time, respectively. This greatly contrasts with Democratically 
controlled governorships and senate chambers, which chose to create a state exchange 85.7 and 

























Exchange	  Decisions	  by	  Political	  Party	  
Yes	  
No	  
Political	  Science	  Department	  
University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  
27	  
	  
randomly determined. There is a large relationship between the political control in a state and the 
exchange type that it chose to pursue. This relationship is furthered by the correlation 
coefficients between both the party of the governor and senate, and the type of exchange created. 
For the governorship, the correlation coefficient between political party and exchange type is 
.678 (sig. = .000). In the case of the senate, the correlation coefficient between political party and 
exchange type is even stronger at .721 (sig = .000). Based on these correlations, I have 
determined that the exchange type is endogenous. It is largely determined by the political party 
of the governor and senate. 
 
Figure 8: Instrumental Variables Model 
 
  
In order to address this problem of endogeneity, I propose an instrumental variables 
model as a viable alternative approach to OLS regression. While I do not discredit my initial 
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potential problem of endogeneity. As I have mentioned before, the type of exchange that was 
chosen by a state government is often determined by its political party control. Because of the 
strong correlation between these two concepts, I propose using the two political party variables 
as instruments on the type of exchange. However, before using these variables as instruments, I 
must first make sure that they do not have their own unique effects on the dependent variable 
(change in uninsured population). 
 First, I look back at my OLS regression results. In this regression, both the governor and 
senate political party variables did not have a significant effect on the change in uninsured 
population. From these results, it appears that these variables do not greatly impact the change in 
uninsured population directly. After looking at these initial results, I also tabulated the 
correlations between the governor’s party (r = -.321) and senate’s party (r = -.231) and found that 
the political party variables were not strongly correlated with the change in uninsured population. 
Based on these two findings, as well as the strong correlations between political party and 
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Table 4: “Better Access to Care” IV Model (First Stage) 
IV Regression (Dependent Variable: Exchange Type) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value (*Sig) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.307 0.124 0.017* 
Poverty Rate 0.005 0.016 0.771 
Governor’s Party 0.314 0.111 0.007* 
Senate Party Control 0.341 0.129 0.012* 
HMO Penetration 0.003 0.005 0.536 
Minority Percentage -0.003 0.004 0.484 
Coefficient 0.007 0.212 0.975 
N = 50, F = 15.63, Prob > F = 0.000, R-Squared = 0.6857, Adjusted R-Squared = 0.6418 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
 The first stage of the regression illustrates the reasoning behind using governor’s party 
and senate party control as instruments. Along with Medicaid expansion, both the governor’s 
party and senate party control are significant at the 95% confidence level. This indicates that they 
are effective instruments for determining the exchange type of a state. As I originally predicted, 
these two variables are the most important predictors of exchange type. The p-value of the entire 
model is also important to note in this situation. At .000, the p-value shows that our instruments 
are effective in predicting the outcome of exchange type. Based on these statistics in the first 
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Table 5: “Better Access to Care” IV Model (Second Stage) 
IV Regression (Dependent Variable: Percentage Point Change in Uninsured Population) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value (*Sig) 
Exchange Type -1.698 1.085 0.125 
Medicaid Expansion -1.637 0.930 0.085 
Poverty Rate -0.267 0.100 0.010* 
HMO Penetration 0.056 0.032 0.074 
Minority Percentage -0.023 0.023 0.430 
Coefficient 1.610 1.306 0.251 
N = 50, F = 4.90, Prob > F = 0.012, R-Squared = 0.3567 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
 The second (and final) stage of the regression reveals important new characteristics about 
the independent variables. When viewing the two choice variables, it is evident that neither is 
significant at the 95% confidence level. However, both exchange type (p = 0.125) and Medicaid 
expansion (p = 0.085) have very low p-values, and appear to contain joint significance. I test this 
significance later in the analysis. Based on the negative coefficients of these variables, it appears 
that their presence reduced the percentage of uninsured citizens within a state. As for the control 
variables, the only one that is significant at the 95% level is the poverty rate of a state. The 
coefficient on this variable is negative at -0.267. This indicates that the more impoverished a 
state is, the more likely its uninsured population dropped during the first enrollment period. The 
other control variables are not significant at the 95% level. However, the managed care 
penetration of a state seems to play a role in the model (p = .074). Ultimately, this model 
provides an excellent second look at the choice variables that I examine. 
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Table 6: “Better Access to Care” IV Hypothesis Test 
Joint Significance Test 
Variables P-Value (*Sig) 
Exchange Type, Medicaid Expansion 0.001* 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
 As I already did in the OLS model, it is important to find the direct impact of state 
government actions on “better access to care.” Once again, I use a joint significance test to 
determine whether or not exchange type and Medicaid expansion have a joint effect on the 
change in uninsured population. The results of the test illustrate that the type of exchange and 
Medicaid expansion are jointly significant at the 95% confidence level based on the instrumental 
variables model. This leads me to reject the hypothesis that, when controlling for other factors, 
exchange type and Medicaid expansion have no effect on the change in uninsured population. 
Specifically, the coefficients on these two variables (-1.698 for exchange type, -1.637 for 
Medicaid expansion) illustrate their marginal effects on the uninsured population. This 
conclusion, as well as the magnitude of the coefficient, lends support to my initial hypothesis. 
 
iv. Results/Conclusion 
 This section includes two unique models to analyze the impact of state government 
actions on “better access to care”. While each model presents slightly different numbers, they 
both contain very similar results. The OLS model isolates Medicaid expansion as the key factor 
in providing “better access to care”. According to the model, states that expanded Medicaid saw 
a decrease in uninsured population of 1.95 percentage points more than states that chose not to 
expand Medicaid when controlling for other factors. The variable for exchange creation was not 
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statistically significant in this model, but it was significant when jointly tested with Medicaid 
expansion. For the instrumental variables model, neither Medicaid expansion nor exchange 
creation was statistically significant on its own. However, the joint significance test showed that 
the two state government actions are significant at the 99% confidence level. Both models lead 
me to conclude the following result. 
 
Result for Goal 1: In supporting the goal of “better access to care”, I find that states that acted 
on exchange implementation or expansion of Medicaid are more likely to have positive results 
than those that did not. Specifically, states that expanded Medicaid were most likely to provide 
“better access to care” for citizens. However, there is considerable evidence that exchange 
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VI. Goal 2: “More Affordable Coverage” 
i. Specific Research Design 
Dependent Variable: Insurance Premium 
Figure 9 (Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015) 
 
 
The last of the two goals that must be operationally defined is “more affordable 
coverage.” To measure the effectiveness of the ACA on affordability, I do a state-by-state 
comparison of premium rates (with subsidies included) adjusted for cost of living for similar 
plans. It is important to note that this method is slightly different from the method that I use for 
“better access to care”. Instead of doing a time comparison for each state’s premium rate, I 
compare premium rates across states at a fixed time (2015). I selected this method because I did 
not have viable time-series data for premium rate. Using data from the Kaiser Family Foundation 
(2015), it is easy to compare premiums for individuals in similar situations. In this case, I use 
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data on the average price for a bronze plan after tax credits for a 40-year-old non-smoker in 
different cities. The specific cities and their individual pricing are presented in the appendix. I do 
not include them here for the sake of preserving space. It is important to note that there is exactly 
one city for all 50 states. I use the cost of living (Pay Scale 2015, 1) adjustment to observe the 
real cost of health care in each area instead of the less meaningful, nominal rate. The probability 
density of this variable is presented above in figure nine. It is slightly skewed left, but not 
enough to greatly alter the mean. 
 
Control Variables: City Poverty, Managed Care Penetration, Minority Population 
 Table 7: Bivariate Correlations with Insurance Premium 
Variable Correlation Coefficient Significance 
City Poverty 0.208 0.147 
HMO Penetration -0.129 0.371 
Minority Population -0.301 0.034* 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
For this model, I use the same control variables as I did for the first goal with some minor 
adjustments. I keep the model the same because it contains the most relevant predictors of the 
insurance market. Because the dependent variable that I use is for cities instead of states, I try to 
implement city-level data where available. Unfortunately, I was only able to find comprehensive, 
city-level data for poverty (Congressional Research Service 2013, 47), so the other variables 
remain unchanged. However, because most of the cities used in this set encompass the majority 
of the population in their respective states, I find it appropriate to still use state level data for the 
other variables. I also remove political party as an independent variable because of its lack of 
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relevance in determining cost. However, it is included as an instrumental variable in the 
instrumental variables model. The correlations for these variables with my independent variable 
are presented in table seven. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 8 (Sources: Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, 2014; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014 
2015; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010; Congressional Research Service, 2013) 
Variable Mean  Standard Deviation 
Insurance Premium 120.765 29.197 
Exchange Type 0.46 0.50 
Medicaid Expansion 0.48 0.50 
City Poverty Rate 14.074 3.163 
Governor’s Party 0.42 0.50 
Senate Party Control 0.40 0.49 
HMO Penetration 17.61 11.68 
Minority Percentage 28.60 15.48 
 
 In table eight, I present the relevant summary statistics for the variables in my model for 
“more affordable coverage”. Most of these variables are contained in my original discussion of 
the summary statistics for “better access to care”, so I do not discuss them here. Instead, I focus 
on the two new variables for this section: insurance premium and city poverty rate. The mean for 
insurance rate is 120.765, indicating that the mean premium rate for my given insurance plan and 
demographic is $120.66 per month. The standard deviation, which is 29.197, provides a decent 
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idea of the dispersion of premium rates among different cities. As for the city poverty rate, the 
mean is at a value of 14.074%. This value is easily compared to the mean poverty rate by state, 
which is 12.142%. I expected that the city poverty rate mean would be slightly higher due to the 
large concentration of impoverished Americans in cities. The standard deviation of 3.163 
indicates a moderate dispersion among city poverty values. While these summary statistics do 
not say much on their own, they are important to keep in mind for the next stage of the thesis.  
 
ii. Data Analysis: OLS Regression 
Table 9: “More Affordable Coverage” OLS Model 
OLS Regression (Dependent Variable: Insurance Premium) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value (*Sig) 
Exchange Type -9.558 9.252 0.307 
Medicaid Expansion 3.976 8.582 0.645 
City Poverty Rate 2.969 2.094 0.163 
HMO Penetration 0.297 0.497 0.553 
Minority Percentage -0.867 0.347 0.016* 
Coefficient 101.047 29.471 0.001* 
N = 50, Prob > F = 0.012, R-Squared = 0.2074 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
 The OLS regression presents inconclusive results. Based on the p-values for exchange 
creation and Medicaid expansion, I cannot draw a conclusion about their individual effect on 
insurance premiums. At the 95% confidence level, I fail to reject that exchange creation has no 
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effect on insurance premiums. The same case is true for Medicaid expansion. At the 95% 
confidence level, I fail to reject that Medicaid expansion has no effect on insurance premiums.  
Despite the lack of meaningful effect for my choice variables, one of my control 
variables is statistically significant. At the 95% confidence level, I reject the hypothesis that 
minority population has no effect on insurance premiums. Based on its coefficient, I conclude 
that an increased level of minorities in a city causes its insurance premiums to decrease. This 
finding provides some meaningful information about the insurance market, but it does not 
describe a meaningful relationship between state government actions and the goal of "more 
affordable coverage". In order to evaluate this relationship in a more complete manner, I turn to a 
joint significance test for my two choice variables. 
 
Table 10: “More Affordable Coverage” OLS Hypothesis Test 
Joint Significance Test 
Variables P-Value (*Sig) 
Exchange Type, Medicaid Expansion 0.575 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
In this case, the joint significance test is also inconclusive. At the 95% confidence level, I 
fail to reject the hypothesis that both exchange type and Medicaid expansion have no effect on 
insurance premiums. While these variables are not statistically significant, it is important to view 
their coefficients and evaluate them. This regression is especially notable because the two choice 
variables seem to work in opposite directions. Exchange type has a negative coefficient, 
indicating that states that chose a state exchange are more likely to have lower premiums. I 
expect this finding under the assumption that positive state government actions will cause 
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positive outcomes for the law. However, the coefficient for Medicaid expansion weakens support 
for this assumption. As shown in table nine, the coefficient for Medicaid expansion is positive. 
This indicates that states that chose to expand Medicaid tend to have higher insurance premiums. 
This coefficient is very notable because it represents a positive state government action resulting 
in a negative outcome. This phenomenon requires further analysis, which is done in the second 
model for "more affordable coverage". It is important to note that the coefficients for these two 
variables are to not be taken as completely relevant, as both variables are not statistically 
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iii. Data Analysis: IV Regression 
Figure 10: Instrumental Variables Model 
 
  
The same endogeneity problems exist for the goal of “more affordable coverage” as they 
did with “better access to care”. Once again, the problems are with the choice variable of 
exchange type. The variable is not randomly assigned but rather highly correlated with the 
political party control of a state. For this reason, I use the same instrumental variables method for 
the goal of “more affordable coverage”. As visually illustrated in figure 10, this model uses the 
political party of the governor and senate as instruments for exchange type. I hope to eliminate 
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Table 11: “More Affordable Coverage” IV Model (First Stage) 
IV Regression (Dependent Variable: Exchange Type) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value (*Sig) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.299 0.124 0.020* 
City Poverty Rate 0.011 0.015 0.476 
Governor’s Party 0.327 0.112 0.006* 
Senate Party Control 0.351 0.129 0.009* 
HMO Penetration 0.003 0.005 0.576 
Minority Percentage -0.003 0.003 0.415 
Coefficient -0.078 0.219 0.721 
N = 50, F = 15.68, Prob > F = 0.000, R-Squared = 0.6888, Adjusted R-Squared = 0.6454 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
Much like the IV regression for “better access to care”, the first stage of the regression 
illustrates the reasoning behind using governor’s party and senate party control as instruments. 
The estimates are very similar to the first goal, as only the poverty rate variable is altered to 
reflect city-level data instead of state-level. Along with Medicaid expansion, both the governor’s 
party and senate party control are significant at the 95% confidence level. This indicates that they 
are effective instruments for determining the exchange type of a state. The p-value of the entire 
model is also important to note in this situation. At .000, the p-value shows that our instruments 
are effective in predicting the outcome of exchange type. Based on these statistics in the first 
stage, the given instruments are excellent choices for the exchange type variable. 
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Table 12: “More Affordable Coverage” IV Model (Second Stage) 
IV Regression (Dependent Variable: Insurance Premium) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value (*Sig) 
Exchange Type -40.287 18.858 0.038* 
Medicaid Expansion 24.524 14.128 0.090 
City Poverty Rate 2.666 2.195 0.231 
HMO Penetration 0.521 0.563 0.360 
Minority Percentage -0.964 0.397 0.019* 
Coefficient 108.412 30.747 0.001* 
N = 50, Prob > F = 0.011, R-Squared = 0.079 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
 The IV model presents several notable results. First, as with the OLS model, the minority 
percentage is significant at the 95% confidence level. At this level, I reject the hypothesis that the 
percentage of minority citizens in a state has no effect on city-level insurance premiums, 
controlling for all other factors. This result is consistent with the OLS model, so I generally 
expected it to occur. However, for the first time in this analysis, this regression presents a new 
result that is not present in the OLS model. According to the IV model, at the 95% confidence 
level, I reject the hypothesis that exchange type has no effect on city-level insurance premiums. 
The coefficient on this variable indicates that states that chose a state marketplace can expect to 
have $40.29 less in insurance premium rates than those that opted for a federal exchange.  
This significant result represents a potentially important finding in relation to state 
government actions and ACA implementation. However, it must not be taken as a complete and 
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certain result for two main reasons. The first reason deals with the fact that it contrasts with the 
OLS regression results. In the initial regression that I use for “more affordable care”, the 
exchange type variable does not approach significance. It exhibits a p-value of 0.307, indicating 
that exchange type is not a significant factor in determining insurance premium rates. Because of 
this insignificance, I do not consider the significant finding for the IV regression to be certain.  
Secondly, I do not consider the IV finding to be completely legitimate because of the 
coefficient for Medicaid expansion. Throughout this process, one of my key assumptions has 
been that positive state government actions are not detrimental to the implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act. However, the coefficient for Medicaid expansion presents a positive state 
government actions resulting in a negative outcome for “more affordable coverage”. While I do 
not reject the hypothesis that Medicaid expansion has no effect on insurance premiums, it is still 
important to recognize that this variable has a negative coefficient. If state government actions 
truly have an impact on “more affordable coverage”, I expect that positive actions will result in 
positive results. Next, I turn to the joint significance test as another way to test my choice 
variables. 
 
Table 13: “More Affordable Coverage” IV Hypothesis Test 
Joint Significance Test 
Variables P-Value (*Sig) 
Exchange Type, Medicaid Expansion 0.113 
*Represents .05 significance level; two-tailed test 
 The joint hypothesis test for my IV model exhibits the same results as my OLS model. At 
the 95% confidence level, I fail to reject the hypothesis that both exchange type and Medicaid 
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expansion have no effect on insurance premiums. I expected this result, due to the fact that the 
two variables work in opposite directions. In this case, the joint p-value is lower than each of the 
p-values for exchange type and Medicaid expansion as individual variables. This can be 
contributed to the different direction of their coefficients, as mentioned before. While the two 
variables are not jointly significant in either model, that does not render the result of this part of 




This section includes two unique models to analyze the impact of state government 
actions on “more affordable coverage”. While each model is designed to present similar 
numbers, they contain different results. The OLS model does not isolate either state government 
action variable as the deciding factor in “more affordable coverage”. The joint significance test is 
also inconclusive, and the variables for exchange type (negative) and Medicaid expansion 
(positive) actually work in opposite directions. For the instrumental variables model, I received 
slightly different results. In this model, both variables work in opposite directions again. This 
time, however, the exchange type is significant. The differing results in each model present 
problematic evidence for analyzing the exact effect of state government actions on “more 
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Result for Goal 2: In supporting the goal of “more affordable coverage”, I find the exact effect 
to be inconclusive for states that acted on exchange implementation or expansion of Medicaid. 
The results are inconclusive for two main reasons: conflicting results in my two models, and the 
presence of considerable evidence that positive state government actions caused both positive 
and negative results for the goal of “more affordable coverage”. Specifically, there is some 
support for the hypothesis that state exchange creation caused lower premium rates as indicated 
by the IV model (but not the OLS model). But, there is also some support that Medicaid 
expansion caused higher premium rates as indicated by the positive coefficients in both models. 
Due to these conflicting factors, I am unable to present a conclusive finding for “more affordable 
coverage”. While I cannot be sure, this inconclusive finding could potentially indicate that 
insurance costs rely more on the private sector than government actions. The government can 
only control the structure of the market and encourage competition; it does not have much 
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 For this analysis, I execute every step of the research process in trying to find a solution 
to my initial research question. First, I introduce the reader to the topic and the relevant literature 
within this topic. Next, I provide a theoretical model and causal mechanism that underlines my 
theory on the topic. In this section, I also hypothesize about the impact of state government 
actions on the Affordable Care Act. My hypothesis is that in a comparison of states, those that 
set up Affordable Care Act exchanges and/or expanded Medicaid will be more likely to have 
positive results than those that did not. Conversely, those that did not set up Affordable Care Act 
exchanges and/or expanded Medicaid will be more likely to have negative results than those that 
did. I then present a research design that tests my hypothesis. This design focuses on two 
specific goals of the ACA: “better access to care” and “more affordable coverage”. After 
explaining these goals, I execute two different empirical models for each goal. These models 
lead me to several conclusions.  
In supporting the goal of “better access to care”, I conclude that states that acted on 
exchange implementation or expansion of Medicaid are more likely to have positive results than 
those that did not. Specifically, states that expanded Medicaid were most likely to provide “better 
access to care” for citizens. In supporting the goal of “more affordable coverage”, I find the exact 
effect to be inconclusive for states that acted on exchange implementation or expansion of 
Medicaid. The results are inconclusive for two main reasons: conflicting results in my two 
models, and the presence of considerable evidence that positive state government actions caused 
both positive and negative results for the goal of “more affordable coverage”. Ultimately, I find 
hypothesis to be fully supported by my research. While some of the details are conflicting, there 
is no question that states that set up Affordable Care Act exchanges and/or expanded Medicaid 
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were more likely to have positive results than those that did not. Conversely, there is also no 
doubt that states that did not act on the law were more likely to encounter negative results. 
My research presents a very important finding for the health care literature. However, it 
also expands beyond this narrow finding. More broadly, it illustrates an important concept for 
truly federal laws. When states are required to aid the implementation of a federal law, their 
cooperation is important for its success. If a state does not support a law, it can cause some truly 
devastating effects for the law’s goals, as indicated by my findings. Despite these important 
findings, there is considerable room for other researchers to add to this study and investigate 
other important areas.  
Specifically, I suggest three expansions/additions. First, it is important for other 
researchers that are investigating health care to try other independent variables that they find 
intriguing. While I believe my model to be an accurate predictor of the insurance industry, it is 
important for other researchers to use other models and come to alternative conclusions. I tested 
this model thoroughly and found it to be useful, but other researchers should be able to alter it. 
Another valuable extension involves more current data. My analysis mostly focuses on the first 
enrollment period and the statistics that stemmed from it. While this represents an important time 
for the ACA, it is just as important to study other enrollment periods and how the law develops 
over time. I would suggest that other researchers address this development in future studies. 
Lastly, I suggest that researchers explore other truly federal laws and how state government 
actions affect them. It would be valuable to have another study that describes this phenomenon. 
Ultimately, I have presented a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between state 
government actions and the Affordable Care Act that has broader implications for federalism. 
However, I am excited to view the new analyses that researchers conduct in the future. 
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Cities/Premium Rates (Sources: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015; Pay Scale, 2015) 
City Premium ($) City Premium 
Birmingham, AL 160.00 Billings, MT 157.00 
Anchorage, AK 29.82 Omaha, NE 137.70 
Phoenix, AZ 159.80 Las Vegas, NV 132.44 
Little Rock, AR 124.20 Manchester, NH 114.66 
Los Angeles, CA 96.56 Newark, NJ 118.57 
Denver, CO 123.25 Albuquerque, NM 154.00 
Hartford, CT 83.62 New York, NY 61.91 
Wilmington, DE 140.28 Charlotte, NC 119.70 
Miami, FL 113.16 Fargo, ND 144.96 
Atlanta, GA 149.73 Cleveland, OH 128.48 
Honolulu, HI 75.79 Oklahoma City, OK 129.00 
Boise, ID 160.55 Portland, OR 122.10 
Chicago, IL 115.50 Philadelphia, PA 107.31 
Indianapolis, IN 123.19 Providence, RI 93.98 
Cedar Rapids, IA 112.52 Columbia, SC 134.90 
Wichita, KS 131.67 Sioux Falls, SD 167.44 
Louisville, KT 157.14 Nashville, TN 140.39 
New Orleans, LA 98.58 Houston, TX 120.12 
Portland, ME 122.18 Salt Lake City, UT 140.43 
Baltimore, MD 105.41 Burlington, VT 100.32 
Boston, MA 114.18 Richmond, VA 114.66 
Detroit, MI 140.76 Seattle, WA 86.64 
Minneapolis, MN 96.60 Huntington, WV 156.00 
Jackson, MS 43.26 Milwaukee, WI 120.06 
St. Louis, MO 120.00 Cheyenne, WY 137.75 











. summ uninsure adjpremium exchange2 medicaid hmo poverty minority governor senate 
citypoverty 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    uninsure |        50        -2.8    2.534658      -10.1        5.1 
  adjpremium |        50    120.7654    29.19706      29.82     167.44 
   exchange2 |        50         .46    .5034574          0          1 
    medicaid |        50         .48     .504672          0          1 
         hmo |        50     17.6127    11.67668   .1153977    58.1212 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     poverty |        50      12.142    3.043567        5.6       20.1 
    minority |        50        28.6    15.47961        5.6       77.3 
    governor |        50         .42    .4985694          0          1 
      senate |        50          .4    .4948717          0          1 
 citypoverty |        50      14.074    3.163491        7.1         22 
 
. reg uninsure exchange2 medicaid poverty governor senate hmo minority 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      50 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,    42) =    3.70 
       Model |  120.092967     7  17.1561381           Prob > F      =  0.0033 
    Residual |  194.707036    42   4.6358818           R-squared     =  0.3815 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2784 
       Total |  314.800003    49  6.42448985           Root MSE      =  2.1531 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    uninsure |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   exchange2 |  -1.192329    1.08974    -1.09   0.280    -3.391514    1.006855 
    medicaid |  -1.953262   .9462426    -2.06   0.045    -3.862857   -.0436673 
     poverty |  -.2617139   .1146689    -2.28   0.028    -.4931252   -.0303026 
    governor |  -.8991458   .8642203    -1.04   0.304    -2.643213    .8449214 
      senate |   .7285455   .9970461     0.73   0.469    -1.283575    2.740666 
         hmo |   .0561072   .0344683     1.63   0.111    -.0134527    .1256671 
    minority |  -.0226535   .0257947    -0.88   0.385    -.0747093    .0294024 
       _cons |   1.609679   1.514473     1.06   0.294    -1.446652     4.66601 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test exchange2 medicaid 
 
 ( 1)  exchange2 = 0 
 ( 2)  medicaid = 0 
 
       F(  2,    42) =    4.03 
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. reg uninsure exchange2 medicaid hmo poverty minority governor senate, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      50 
                                                       F(  7,    42) =    3.83 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0027 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3815 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.1531 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    uninsure |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   exchange2 |  -1.192329   .8726029    -1.37   0.179    -2.953313    .5686546 
    medicaid |  -1.953262   .6716533    -2.91   0.006    -3.308714    -.597811 
         hmo |   .0561072   .0309494     1.81   0.077    -.0063512    .1185657 
     poverty |  -.2617139   .1020027    -2.57   0.014    -.4675636   -.0558642 
    minority |  -.0226535    .023224    -0.98   0.335    -.0695214    .0242145 
    governor |  -.8991458   .8473689    -1.06   0.295    -2.609206    .8109139 
      senate |   .7285455    1.10891     0.66   0.515    -1.509325    2.966416 
       _cons |   1.609679   1.400448     1.15   0.257    -1.216539    4.435898 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test exchange2 medicaid 
 
 ( 1)  exchange2 = 0 
 ( 2)  medicaid = 0 
 
       F(  2,    42) =    4.57 
            Prob > F =    0.0160 
 





      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      50 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,    43) =   15.63 
       Model |    8.516208     6    1.419368           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |    3.903792    43  .090785861           R-squared     =  0.6857 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6418 
       Total |       12.42    49  .253469388           Root MSE      =  .30131 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   exchange2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         hmo |   .0029953   .0048018     0.62   0.536    -.0066885    .0126791 
     poverty |   .0047025   .0160308     0.29   0.771    -.0276267    .0370316 
    minority |  -.0025323    .003589    -0.71   0.484    -.0097702    .0047056 
    medicaid |   .3074187   .1238409     2.48   0.017     .0576697    .5571678 
      senate |    .341004    .129474     2.63   0.012     .0798949    .6021131 
    governor |   .3138171   .1110678     2.83   0.007     .0898276    .5378066 
















Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      50 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    44) =    4.68 
       Model |  112.289579     5  22.4579159           Prob > F      =  0.0016 
    Residual |  202.510423    44  4.60250962           R-squared     =  0.3567 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2836 
       Total |  314.800003    49  6.42448985           Root MSE      =  2.1453 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    uninsure |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   exchange2 |  -1.698271   1.607894    -1.06   0.297    -4.938768    1.542226 
         hmo |   .0579727   .0353179     1.64   0.108    -.0132058    .1291511 
     poverty |  -.2673532   .1125117    -2.38   0.022    -.4941057   -.0406007 
    minority |  -.0184997   .0255918    -0.72   0.474    -.0700765    .0330772 
    medicaid |  -1.636992   1.255038    -1.30   0.199    -4.166356    .8923711 
       _cons |   1.521198    1.50989     1.01   0.319    -1.521785    4.564182 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  exchange2 
Instruments:   hmo poverty minority medicaid senate governor 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test exchange2 medicaid 
 
 ( 1)  exchange2 = 0 
 ( 2)  medicaid = 0 
 
       F(  2,    44) =    9.54 
            Prob > F =    0.0004 
 






      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      50 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,    43) =   15.63 
       Model |    8.516208     6    1.419368           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |    3.903792    43  .090785861           R-squared     =  0.6857 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6418 
       Total |       12.42    49  .253469388           Root MSE      =  .30131 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   exchange2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         hmo |   .0029953   .0048018     0.62   0.536    -.0066885    .0126791 
     poverty |   .0047025   .0160308     0.29   0.771    -.0276267    .0370316 
    minority |  -.0025323    .003589    -0.71   0.484    -.0097702    .0047056 
    medicaid |   .3074187   .1238409     2.48   0.017     .0576697    .5571678 
      senate |    .341004    .129474     2.63   0.012     .0798949    .6021131 
    governor |   .3138171   .1110678     2.83   0.007     .0898276    .5378066 
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Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      50 
                                                       F(  5,    44) =    4.90 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0012 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3567 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.1453 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    uninsure |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   exchange2 |  -1.698271   1.084952    -1.57   0.125    -3.884847    .4883051 
         hmo |   .0579727   .0316858     1.83   0.074    -.0058859    .1218312 
     poverty |  -.2673532    .099859    -2.68   0.010    -.4686058   -.0661005 
    minority |  -.0184997    .023219    -0.80   0.430    -.0652944    .0282951 
    medicaid |  -1.636992   .9302148    -1.76   0.085    -3.511717    .2377324 
       _cons |   1.521198   1.306421     1.16   0.251    -1.111721    4.154117 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  exchange2 
Instruments:   hmo poverty minority medicaid senate governor 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test exchange2 medicaid 
 
 ( 1)  exchange2 = 0 
 ( 2)  medicaid = 0 
 
       F(  2,    44) =    8.47 
            Prob > F =    0.0008 
 
. reg adjpremium exchange2 medicaid hmo citypoverty minority, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      50 
                                                       F(  5,    44) =    3.32 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0124 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2074 
                                                       Root MSE      =  27.431 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  adjpremium |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   exchange2 |  -9.558285   9.252162    -1.03   0.307    -28.20479    9.088222 
    medicaid |   3.976169   8.582495     0.46   0.645    -13.32071    21.27305 
         hmo |   .2969125   .4968983     0.60   0.553    -.7045202    1.298345 
 citypoverty |   2.968666   2.094156     1.42   0.163    -1.251829     7.18916 
    minority |   -.867255   .3474937    -2.50   0.016    -1.567583   -.1669273 





















. ivreg adjpremium medicaid hmo citypoverty minority (exchange2 = governor senate), r 





      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      50 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,    43) =   15.86 
       Model |  8.55486879     6  1.42581147           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  3.86513121    43  .089886772           R-squared     =  0.6888 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6454 
       Total |       12.42    49  .253469388           Root MSE      =  .29981 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   exchange2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    medicaid |   .2988533   .1239154     2.41   0.020     .0489541    .5487524 
         hmo |   .0026297   .0046633     0.56   0.576    -.0067747    .0120342 
 citypoverty |   .0108693   .0151165     0.72   0.476     -.019616    .0413546 
    minority |  -.0028492   .0034648    -0.82   0.415    -.0098366    .0041382 
    governor |   .3266874   .1122318     2.91   0.006     .1003504    .5530245 
      senate |   .3511059    .128919     2.72   0.009      .091116    .6110958 




Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      50 
                                                       F(  5,    44) =    3.38 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0113 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0788 
                                                       Root MSE      =  29.572 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  adjpremium |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   exchange2 |  -40.28728   18.85842    -2.14   0.038    -78.29392   -2.280631 
    medicaid |    24.5239   14.12804     1.74   0.090    -3.949292     52.9971 
         hmo |    .521014   .5632599     0.92   0.360    -.6141617     1.65619 
 citypoverty |   2.666066   2.195291     1.21   0.231    -1.758253    7.090385 
    minority |  -.9644907   .3966423    -2.43   0.019    -1.763871   -.1651107 
       _cons |   108.4118   30.74665     3.53   0.001     46.44603    170.3776 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  exchange2 
Instruments:   medicaid hmo citypoverty minority governor senate 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
